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Abstract
This Essay examines the debate over how the WTO and the public interact. Since the mass
public is cacophonous, the debate centers on what role NGOs should play in the WTO. NGOs
are voluntary organizations of individuals who come together to achieve common purposes. As
used here, NGOs include business and labor groups. This Essay contains five parts. Part I provides
background for readers just joining the debate. Part II gives an overview of the major developments
over the past three years (1998-2000). Parts III and IV offer a synthesis of the key issues. Part III
presents the Statist perspective for why the WTO should deny deeper participation to NGOs. Part
IV counters with the Individualist perspective for why the WTO should broaden its participation
beyond governments to include NGOs. (Part IV reflects the author’s own views.) Part V provides
specific recommendations for how the WTO should increase opportunities for NGOs.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the World Trade Organization' ("WTO")? A reader
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization would see that it is an international organization set
up to supervise national trade policy. As of December 2000, the
WTO had 141 member governments. The WTO is located in
Geneva and led by a Director-General. Unlike some other inter-
national agencies (such as the International Monetary Fund),
the WTO is a consensus-based institution driven by the member
governments themselves, rather than by the Director-General or
the staff of the Secretariat. Thus, in some ways, the WTO is di-
rected not only in Geneva, but also in each of the national
capitals from Tiranfi to Harare.
International trade has been a controversial issue many
times in the past, as it is today in a wave of globalization. 2 In the
early 1990s, a new school of criticism developed about the im-
pact of world trade on development, the community, the envi-
ronment, and public health. This led to questions about how
world trade rules are made and who makes them. Some com-
mentators began to claim that the trade regime has a "demo-
cratic deficit" and that it is not accountable to the public. The
street protestors at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in
late 1999 voiced all of these concerns.
In contrast to the United Nations, the WTO operates in a
closed manner. Although nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") have always had opportunities to participate in many
* Attorney, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. The views expressed are those of the au-
thor. Support for this research was provided by the Ford Foundation through the
Global Environment & Trade Study.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
2. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE
TRADE (1996).
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U.N. activities, NGOs lack equivalent opportunities at the WTO.3
Thus, NGOs that want to influence the WTO have to localize
their campaigns. Many NGOs contend that the WTO needs to
change by becoming more open to nongovernmental interests.
This Essay examines the debate over how the WTO and the
public interact. Since the mass public is cacophonous, the de-
bate centers on what role NGOs should play in the WTO. NGOs
are voluntary organizations of individuals who come together to
achieve common purposes.4 As used here, NGOs include busi-
ness and labor groups.
This Essay contains five parts. Part I provides background
for readers just joining the debate. Part II gives an overview of
the major developments over the past three years (1998-2000).
Parts III and IV offer a synthesis of the key issues. Part III
presents the Statist perspective for why the WTO should deny
deeper participation to NGOs. Part IV counters with the Individ-
ualist perspective for why the WTO should broaden its participa-
tion beyond governments to include NGOs. (Part IV reflects the
author's own views.) Part V provides specific recommendations
for how the WTO should increase opportunities for NGOs.
I. EARLY YEARS OF NGO RELATIONS WITH THE
TRADING SYSTEM
For most of the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade5 ("GATT"), the relationship between the trading sys-
tem and nongovernmental actors was not an issue.6 The Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") occasionally partici-
pated in GATT organs, and this practice was apparently not
3. See ROBERT O'BRIEN ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 140 (2000).
4. See generally THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Ann
M. Florini ed., 2000); JULIE FISHER, NONGOVERNMENTS: NGOS AND THE POLITICAL DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD (1998); P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, FOR-
EIGN POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 82.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
6. See GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 41, 53 (1965) (not-
ing that the absence of NGOs in GATT and suggesting that this geographic separation
in Geneva had improved the climate for trade negotiations). Twenty years later, the
"GATT Wisemen" report recommended that "[a] t the international level, trade policy
and the functioning of the trading system should be made more open." GATT, TRADE
POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE (1985). But the call for openness referred to national
trade policy, not to the GATT as an institution.
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questioned.7 But no other NGOs sought to be included. In his
comprehensive study of the GATT published in 1969, John Jack-
son devoted, a short section to the "Private Citizen and GATT
Obligations," in which he noted that "in accord with traditional
international law thinking . . . a citizen can usually only make
policy recommendations to GATT through his government and
can only in that way seek relief if he is injured by foreign activi-
ties inconsistent with GATT."8 Looking ahead, however, Jackson
foresaw "the value at some future time of considering institu-
tional arrangements that would give a hearing to private individ-
uals in international economic affairs."9
This future time arrived twenty years later. As the Uruguay
Round (1986-1994) trade negotiations intensified in the late
1980s, NGOs interested in agriculture, development, and food
safety began monitoring the trade talks. The emerging agree-
ments provoked alarm.10 More consternation arose when the
NGOs found it impossible to provide the negotiators with direct
input. When the GATT Ministerial Conference met in Brussels
in December 1990, a group of NGOs came to the conference site
and denounced the ongoing round as a "GATTastrophe." 1
By 1990-1991, a somewhat new issue catapulted into the
public consciousness, the relationship between trade and the en-
vironment. After the GATT panel in the infamous case United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna-Dolphin") issued
its decision in summer 1991-holding that a U.S. conservation
law violated GATT rules-environmentalists around the world
took notice and began scrutinizing GATT.12 The initial assess-
ment was that GATT panels were secretive, closed, and made de-
7. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 444 n.3, 453, 457
(1969).
8. Id. at 187.
9. Id. at 189.
10. See generally RALPH NADER ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT,
NAF-A, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER (1993); JONATHAN RAUCH,
DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 52 (1994) (discussing
Mark Ritchie and the Citizen Trade Campaign); Steve Charnovitz, No Time for NEPA:
Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 195, 196-97 (1994) (discussing
anti-trade intellectuals).
11. JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 276 (1995).
12. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. 39S/155 (Sept. 3,
1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Case]. See generally Symposium, Trade and the Environ-
ment, 23 ENVTL. L. 387 (1993).
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cisions about the environment without adequate input. 3
Shortly after the Tuna-Dolphin decision was handed down, the
Washington and Lee University School of Law held a symposium
on "Environmental Quality and Free Trade" that addressed
these developments. One of the speakers was John Jackson, who
pointed out that the GATT could enhance its "transparency" by
allowing NGOs and other inter-governmental organizations to
gain some "participation in the GATT processes, possibly
through an annual open meeting." 4 With regard to dispute set-
tlement, he suggested that some way might be found for inter-
ested groups to transmit "arguments, information and evi-
dence."
Although little noted at that time, change was underway.
The draft text for a Multilateral (later changed to World) Trade
Organization included a provision authorizing "suitable arrange-
ments for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental
organizations concerned with matters within the scope of the
MTO."' 5 This provision had been lifted almost verbatim from
the Charter of the International Trade Organization ("ITO") of
1948.16 In 1991, the language on NGOs came into the Uruguay
Round as part of a compromise negotiating text cobbled to-
gether by Arthur Dunkel, then Director-General of GATT. The
13. The first time that environmental advocates sought to attend a GATT panel
hearing was in 1991 during the Tuna-Dolphin dispute. Joshua R. Floum, Defending Dol-
phins and Sea Turtles: On the Front Lines in an "Us-Them"Dialectic, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L.
REV. 943, 952 (1998).
14. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Con-
flict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1255 (1992).
15. Draft of Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA at 93 (Dec. 20, 1991).
16. See Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization art. 87.2, reprinted
in ALSO PRESENT AT THE CREATION: DANA WILGRESS AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT AT HAVANA 171-233 (Michael Hart ed., 1995). The
charter was drafted by the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, but never went
into force. GATT was negotiated during the preparatory sessions for this Conference.
Another inspiration for the NGO provision may have been the two GATT Tokyo Round
plurilateral agreements that provided for NGO involvement. In the Arrangement Re-
garding Bovine Meat (1979), the parties established an International Meat Council
within the framework of GATT and gave it authority to make arrangements for consul-
tation and cooperation with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.
See Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 84 (1979). In
the International Dairy Arrangement (1979), the parties established a Council with the
same authority. See International Dairy Arrangement, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th supp.) at 96
(1979).
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trade negotiators did not discuss this NGO language in detail.
Had they done so, it might have been deleted.
Outside the trading system, several foundations, institutes,
and NGOs took the GATT's measure and began working to in-
crease its openness. A handbook sponsored by the Environmen-
tal Grantmakers Association and the Consultative Group on Bio-
logical Diversity pointed out that "GATT deliberations remained
closed to citizen input and involvement," and noted the contrast
with U.N. agencies that were open to such input.17 In 1993-
1994, a group of experts drafted the Winnipeg Principles on
Trade and Sustainable Development, and one of those princi-
ples was that GATT panels "should entertain written submissions
from non-governmental organizations."18 In early 1994, some
foundations sponsored what became known as the Talloires
Group. This was a back-channel process, chaired by Harvard
Law School Professor Abram Chayes, that sought to bring to-
gether national delegates to the GATT, former government offi-
cials, academics, and executives from other international agen-
cies for the purpose of seeking common ground on environ-
ment and transparency issues.1"
By the mid-1990s, several articles set the tone for the future
debate. Naomi Roht-Arriaza called for "Democracy, Trans-
parency, and Participatory Mechanisms Within GATT," such as
notice and comment procedures.2 ° Robert Housman called for
"Democratizing Trade Negotiations" by according observer sta-
tus to NGOs.21' His proposals were based on the thesis that indi-
viduals have a right to participate in international decisions that
affect their interests.2 2  The author and John Wickham
researched the history of the provision in the ITO Charter re-
garding NGOs, focusing in particular on the plans for imple-
17. THOMAS A. WATHEN, A GUIDE TO TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1992).
18. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES 30-31 (1994).
19. Lawrence E. Susskind et at., Parallel Informal Negotiation: A New Kind of Interna-
tional Dialogue, NEG. J., Dec. 1996, at 19.
20. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of International
Trade Law, 7J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 57, 92-98 (1992).
21. Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 699, 743 (1994).
22. Id. at 703.
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mentation in 1948-1949.2' Their study also pointed out that
NGOs participated in the conference that drafted the ITO Char-
ter.
24
Concerns about the closed nature of GATT dispute settle-
ment resurfaced as an issue in the U.S. Congress in 1994 as it
began the process of approving the Uruguay Round trade agree-
ments. In a speech on Capitol Hill, U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor characterized the GATT panel process as "star
chamber proceedings that are making the most important deci-
sions that affect the lives of all of our citizens-especially in the
environmental area-and there is no accountability whatso-
ever."'25 The U.S. Congress responded by directing the U.S.
Trade Representative to seek the adoption of procedures at the
WTO to ensure "the principle of transparency" through "open
and equitable procedures in trade matters by the WTO Ministe-
rial Conference and the General Council, and by the dispute set-
tlement panels and the Appellate Body."26
It took the WTO General Council about eighteen months to
implement the NGO provision in the Agreement on Establishing
the World Trade Organization. That provision is Article V(2),
which states that "[t] he General Council may make appropriate
arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-gov-
ernmental organizations concerned with matters related to those
of the WTO."2 7
In July 1996, the Council approved "Guidelines for Arrange-
ments on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations '28
("Guidelines"). The NGO Guidelines directed the Secretariat to
23. Steve Charnovitz &John Wickham, Non-Governmental Organizations and the Orig-
inal International Trade Regime, 29J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1995, at 111.
24. See id. at 115.
25. United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Remarks on Trade and En-
vironment at the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment (Feb. 28,
1994).
26. Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Subchapter I-Approval of and General Provisions
Relating to the Uruguay Round Agreements Part C-Uruguay Round Implementation and Dis-
pute Settlement, 19 U.S.C. § 3536 (2000). This provision is vaguer than the one Congress
enacted 20 years earlier which called on the President to seek "the adoption of interna-
tional fair labor standards and of public petition and confrontation procedures in the
GATT." Trade Act of 1974 § 121 (a) (4), 88 Stat. 1978, 1986 (repealed 1998).
27. WTO Agreement art. V(2).
28. Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, De-
cision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996)
[hereinafter NGO Guidelines].
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"play a more active role in its direct contacts with NGOs"
through various means such as symposia and briefings. 29 The
Guidelines noted that the chairpersons of WTO councils and
committees could meet with NGOs, but this would be in their
"personal capacity" unless the council or committee decided
otherwise.3 ° The key guideline came at the end and stated:
Members have pointed to the special character of the WTO,
which is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of
rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for
negotiations. As a result of extensive discussions, there is cur-
rently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be
directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. Closer
consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met
constructively through appropriate processes at the national
level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account
the different elements of public interest which are brought to
bear on trade policy-making.
31
The Guidelines did not explain why the national level
should be the primary one for taking into account the different
elements of public interest regarding trade policymaking. One
might have thought that the WTO, on the international level,
was established to reach agreements that meld the different ele-
ments of public interest. After all, in the Marrakesh Declaration
concluding the Uruguay Round, the Members affirmed "that the
establishment of the World Trade Organization .. .ushers in a
new era of global economic cooperation, reflecting the wide-
spread desire to operate in a fairer and more open multilateral
trading system for the benefit and welfare of their peoples." 2
This Essay will return to these issues in Parts III and IV when it
discusses how open the trading system should be, how to facili-
tate global economic cooperation, and whether ideas for im-
proving the benefit and welfare of peoples need to be exclusively
channeled through a government.
As the WTO was launched in 1995, an academic debate be-
gan on the merits of NGO involvement. Richard Shell proposed
29. Id. para. 4.
30. Id. para. 5.
31. Id. para. 6 (emphasis added).
32. Marrakesh Declaration, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1263 [hereinafter Marrakesh
Declaration].
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a "Trade Stakeholders Model" for opening up the WTO dispute
settlement to all groups with a stake in the outcome of trade
decisions.33 Using the idea of civic republicanism in a constitu-
tional democracy, Shell projected it to the international level
and pondered whether the WTO "can be encouraged to open its
processes to nongovernmental actors so as to make more legiti-
mate decisions regarding trade issues."34 Philip Nichols re-
sponded by pointing out that Shell assumes both "that national
governments do not adequately represent the interests of all of
their constituents" and that participatory governance can work
at the WTO level.35 Nichols denied these propositions and de-
nied that the WTO is undemocratic. Furthermore, he listed sev-
eral potential disadvantages of greater interest group involve-
ment in WTO dispute settiement-such as an irreconcilable dis-
sonance in negotiations, a boon to well-monied interest groups,
and a possible slowdown in trade liberalization. Steve
Charnovitz responded to Nichols by explaining that the case for
NGO participation at the WTO "is not premised on the incom-
petence of national governments to balance domestic inter-
ests.... Instead the contention is that international organiza-
tions will perform more effectively if they have the input of inter-
est groups. '"36 Nichols responded to Charnovitz by asserting that
interest group participation would impose costs on the WTO
and that such groups may not be accountable to the constituen-
cies they purport to represent. 37 His article ends, however, with
the concession that "Charnovitz and I do not disagree that the
World Trade Organization should benefit from the input of enti-
ties other than its own members. I am troubled, however, by the
lack of a rational basis for participation by interest groups. '"38
Back in Geneva, the WTO began to implement its NGO
33. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of
the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829 (1995). See also G. Richard Shell, The
Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 17 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996).
34. Shell, Trade Legalism, supra note 33, at 914.
35. Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 310 (1996).
36. Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 342 (1996).
37. Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 851-72 (1996).
38. Id. at 872.
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Guidelines. In November 1996, the Secretariat commenced in-
formal sessions with NGOs 9 By providing some funding for
travel, the Secretariat was able to encourage attendance of sev-
eral NGOs from middle-income or poor countries, including
Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.
Another key participant was the new International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development ("Centre" or "ICTSD"),
which had just been established to enhance interactions between
the WTO and civil society. 40
In 1996, the General Council took the important step of
permitting NGOs to attend the WTO Ministerial Conference.4"
About 108 NGOs went through the accreditation process and
journeyed to Singapore.42 The Council apparently thought that
inviting NGOs to "observe" implied too much recognition, so
NGOs were merely permitted to "attend."4 At the conclusion of
the Ministerial, the NGOs sought to make a statement, but were
turned down.4 4 Outside of the Ministerial, many NGOs held ed-
ucational fora. The Singapore government prohibited any pub-
lic protests.45
Some further progress in WTO/NGO relations occurred in
the following year. In September 1997, the WTO and the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") co-spon-
sored an NGO Symposium on Trade-Related Issues Affecting
Least-Developed Countries.4 6 The conclusions and recommen-
dations of this Symposium were officially forwarded to a high-
39. See Report of the WTO Informal Sessions with Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs) on Trade and Environment, Trade and Environment News Bulletin, TE/016 (Nov.
28, 1996).
40. See http://www.ictsd.org. The Centre has published several studies about
NGO participation. See, e.g., ICTSD, ACCREDITATION SCHEMES AND OTHER ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR PUBUC PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FoRA (1999).
41. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1998 135-36 (1998).
42. In descending order of size, the NGOs' groupings were business, development,
environment, labor, and other assorted. Final Statistics of the 1st WFO Ministerial Confer-
ence in Singapore: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/statsi-e.htm.
43. Gabrielle Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent?, J.
WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1999, at 5, 12.
44. See Free Telephone Calls, Tiger Beer, Extravaganzas, EARTH TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at
10.
45. See O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 93.
46. Marceau & Pedersen, supra note 43, at 16.
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level inter-governmental meeting shortly thereafter.
4 7
No parallel progress occurred in dispute settlement, how-
ever, or at least not on the surface. In summer 1997, two NGOs
sent amicus curiae briefs to the WTO panel considering United
States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products ("Shrimp-Turtle").4 One of the briefs came from the
World Wide Fund for Nature ("WWF") on behalf of WWF affili-
ates in thirty-one countries. 49 The other came from the Center
for Marine Conservation in the United States.5 ° In September,
the panel informed the parties that it would not consider the
briefs because it did not have authority to do so under the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU").51  While this
spelled failure for the petitioning NGOs, there was a roundabout
gain in getting the panel to make a decision on whether it had
the legal authority to read the briefs. In two episodes in 1996, an
NGO had submitted a brief to the WTO panels on gasoline and
meat hormones, but the panels had refused to acknowledge
those submissions. 2
In summary, in its first three years, the WTO began to im-
47. See Civil Society Recommendations to the High-Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives
for Least-Developed Countries' Trade Development, Report and Recommendations from the
Joint WTO/UNCTAD NGO symposium on Trade-Related Issues Affecting Least-Devel-
oped Countries, WT/LDC/HL/16 (Oct. 24, 1997).
48. United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of
the Panel, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Panel Decision]. This
case involved a complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand about a U.S. im-
port ban on shrimp from countries that the U.S. Secretary of State had not certified as
doing enough to safeguard endangered sea turtles vulnerable to being killed during
shrimp trawling. This episode was discussed by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in
September 1997. Minutes of Meeting, sec. 8, WAT/DSB/M/37 (Sept. 25, 1997).
49. See United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Brief
of Amicus Curiae of the World Wide Fund for Nature (on file with the author).
50. See United'States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Brief
of Amicus Curiae of the Center for Marine Conservation (on file with the author). The
amicus brief was accompanied by a motion to submit an amicus brief.
51. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUARY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. See Shrimp-Turtle
Panel Decision paras. 3.129, 7.8. The panel noted that a government could append
whatever it wanted to its submission. Thereafter, the U.S. government attached a por-
tion of one of the briefs to its submission. See id. para. 7.8.
52. See Daniel Pruzin, Wro Appellate Body Under Fire for Move on Acceptance of Amicus
Briefs, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A-1. In European Communi-
ties-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), the brief was submitted by
Public Citizen, a U.S.-based NGO. Because its brief opposed the U.S. government posi-
tion in the case, Public Citizen could not have relied upon its "own" government to
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plement its constitutional provision for WTO-NGO relations.
The range of consultation and cooperation was very timid at
first, but it expanded as different techniques were tested. These
interactions deepened in 1998, a year that opened a new chapter
in WTO relations with nongovernmental actors.
In concluding this discussion of the early implementation of
Article V(2), it should be noted that one WTO agreement does
provide for an NGO role. That is the Agreement on Preship-
ment Inspection, which calls for the establishment of an "Inde-
pendent Entity" to oversee binding arbitration between export-
ers and inspection entities.5" In 1995, the WTO established this
Independent Entity through an agreement with the ICC and the
International Federation of Inspection Agencies ("IFIA").54 Fur-
thermore, these two NGOs have assisted the WTO in its opera-
tional work on preshipment inspection. For example during
1998, the WTO Working Party on Preshipment Inspection held
"informal" meetings with interested international organizations,
the IFIA and the ICC.55 This cooperation did not take place
under the NGO Guidelines.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WTO RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CIVIL SOCIETY
Part II of this Essay examines the most recent steps by the
WTO to interact with NGOs and efforts by NGOs to influence
the WTO. The emphasis will be on the legal developments, par-
ticularly regarding dispute settlement. Part II also will provide
an overview of NGO-related activity at the WTO.
A. The Battle Over Amicus Curiae Briefs
The DSU does not contain any provision for the submission
of briefs by NGOs (or for that matter by governments that are
represent its views to the panel. See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, Meat
Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 Ir'r'L TRADE REP. 1781, 1786 (1997).
53. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, art. 4
(Apr. 15, 1994), at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/final_e.htm.
54. See Press Release, WTO, Operation of the Independent Entity Established
Under Article 4 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (Feb. 9, 1996), at http://
www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres96_e/psidoc.htm (containing General Council deci-
sion and Agreement between WTO, IFIA, and ICC).
55. See Draft Final Report of the Working Party on Preshipment Inspection, G/PSI/WP/
W/24 (Mar. 5, 1999).
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not Members of the WTO). Individuals who want to give infor-
mation to a panel have no prescribed procedure for doing so.
The DSU rules point to the interest of "full transparency," but
this is contradicted by the requirement that panels meet in
closed sessions. This would seem to rule out public hearings.
The DSU does permit a panel "to seek information and techni-
cal advice from any individual or body which it deems appropri-
ate."56 When doing so, panels are required to inform a govern-
ment before seeking information from within its jurisdiction.
Despite the rejection of their intervention by the Shrimp-Tur-
tie panel, the environmental NGOs were not deterred. As the
U.S. government had appealed the Shrimp-Turtle decision regard-
ing the scope of GATT's General Exceptions, the NGOs saw an
opportunity to offer. their views to the WTO Appellate Body.57
Because the U.S. government was also appealing the panel's de-
cision that it lacked authority to consider the NGO briefs, the
forthcoming proceeding provided an avenue for NGOs to influ-
ence the legal review of their status.
The NGOs seized these opportunities with alacrity. The
groups' drafting briefs included: (1) Earth Island Institute, the
Humane Society, and the Sierra Club; (2) the Center for Marine
Conservation and the Center for International Environmental
Law ("CIEL"), on behalf of these two centers plus the Environ-
mental Foundation Ltd. in Sri Lanka, the Philippine Ecological
Network, the Red Nacional de Accion Ecologia in Chile,
Sobrevivencia in Paraguay, and the Mangrove Action Project;58
and (3) the WWF."5 The NGO briefs came to the Appellate
Body as attachments to the U.S. submission.
In August 1998, the Appellate Body announced that it
would consider the legal arguments offered in the NGO briefs
and that it had accepted a revised brief directly from CIEL.6 0 By
issuing this procedural ruling, the Appellate Body put the com-
plaining parties on notice that it was admitting the briefs so that
56. Id. art. 13.1.
57. See United States-mport Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Shrimp-Turtle Report].
58. See id. (referencing amicus brief of Aug. 3, 1998).
59. See id. para. 79.
60. Id. para. 83. Three governments wrote to the Appellate Body to complain
about this decision. Minutes of Meeting, Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DSB/M/50
(Nov. 6, 1998).
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the parties would have time to respond. During the hearing on
the case, Appellate Body members asked the U.S. government
questions about the substance of the NGO briefs, thus signaling
that they had been read.6
In October 1998, the Appellate Body reversed the lower-
level ruling on whether a panel had the authority to consider
amicus briefs.62 While explaining that NGOs do not have the
"right" to have their briefs considered and that the panels do not
have the -obligation to consider them, the Appellate Body found
authority in the interstices of WTO rules for panels to consider
such unsolicited NGO briefs.63 The responding governments
contended that the panel was right to exclude such submissions
which could be "strongly biased" and could deluge the panel
with unsolicited information from around the world.6
4
Many governments criticized this decision on the grounds
that it was not in conformity with the WTO Agreement.65 In-
deed, some governments argued that the Appellate Body had
given NGOs greater rights than WTO members who were not
party to, the dispute.66 Pakistan called for amending the DSU to
overturn the Appellate Body's ruling.67 In August 1999, a com-
muniqu6 of the G-15 countries argued that because WTO dis-
pute settlement is a government-to-government exercise, the
consideration of amicus curiae briefs would "prejudice an objec-
tive and legal examination of issues.
68
The first case after Shrimp-Turtle in which an NGO impor-
tuned a panel to consider an amicus brief was in United States-
61. Based on interviews with attendees at the closed hearing.
62. See Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report para. 110; James Cameron & Ste-
phen J. Orava, WFO Opens Disputes to Private Voices, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 7, 1998, at B5.
63. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report paras. 99-110. See Donald M. McRae,
The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?, 3J. INT'L ECON. L. 27,
33-35 (2000) (discussing this decision).
64. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report para. 32.
65. GARY P. SAMPSON, TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE WTO: THE POsT-SEATLE
AGENDA 113 (2000).
66. Id. at 113-14. This claim is easily refuted. Since NGOs have no "right" to sub-
mit amicus briefs, their rights cannot be greater than those of governments. Any WTO
member government has a right to intervene as a third party to a case if it has a "sub-
stantial interest" in the matter. DSU art. 10.1. Substantial interest is interpreted
broadly.
67. Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, Communication From Pakistan, WT/GC/W/162 (Apr. 1, 1999).
68. G-15 Communique on WTO Ministerial, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 10, 1999, at 9-10,
para. 19.
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Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead
and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom ("Carbon Stee').6 In July 1999, the American Iron and
Steel Institute submitted an amicus brief, but it was rejected by
the panel on account of its "late submission."7" In the subse-
quent litigation before the Appellate Body, the U.S. steel indus-
try did not make that mistake again. On the same day that the
U.S. government submitted its first brief, the Appellate Body re-
ceived an unsolicited brief from the American Iron and Steel
Institute and the Specialty Steel Industry of North America.71
The parties to the dispute contested whether the Appellate Body
had the authority to accept the briefs directly, rather than as at-
tachments to a government's brief which was the procedural pos-
ture in Shrimp-Turtle.
Some claims of the parties should be noted. The European
Commission argued that NGOs briefs were "inadmissible" to the
Appellate Body because WTO rules did not provide this oppor-
tunity.72 Brazil contended that the Appellate Body lacked au-
thority to accept nongovernmental briefs, and furthermore that
the participating governments were "uniquely qualified to make
legal arguments regarding panel reports and the parameters of
WTO obligations. '73 The United States responded that the Ap-
pellate Body had the requisite authority to accept unsolicited
briefs.74
In its decision in May 2000, the Appellate Body agreed with
the United States regarding amicus briefs. (The United States
lost the case on the merits.) The Appellate Body held that it has
the legal authority to accept and to consider amicus briefs when
"we find it pertinent and useful to do so."'75 In the instant case,
however, the Appellate Body concluded that it was not necessary
69. United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Panel, WT/
DS138/R (Dec. 23, 1999).
70. Id. para. 6.3.
71. United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate Body Carbon Steel Re-
port].
72. Id. para. 36.
73. Id. para. 37.
74. See id. para. 38.
75. Id. para. 42. See generally Arthur E. Appleton, "Amicus Curiae" Submissions in the
"Carbon Steel" Case: Another Rabbit from the Appellate Body's Hat?, 3J. INT'L ECON. L. 691
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to take the two briefs into account.76
The Appellate Body's decision led to a new wave of criticism
by WTO governments.77 Japan said it was highly regrettable that
the Appellate Body made this important decision without taking
into consideration opposing positions of numerous govern-
ments. India protested that the WTO dispute settlement system
was meant to be exclusively for governments. Officials from sev-
eral countries pointed out that the Appellate Body did not pro-
vide sufficient guidance to governments as to when briefs would
be considered pertinent and useful.7
Subsequent to the Carbon Steel panel proceeding, NGOs
have submitted briefs to four panels. In Australia-Measures Af-
fecting Importation of Salmon ("Salmon"), the compliance re-
view panel accepted a letter from the Concerned Fishermen and
Processors in South Australia.79 In European Communities-
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products
("Asbestos"), four NGOs submitted briefs early in the panel pro-
cess."o Subsequently, the defendant European Communities at-
tached two of the briefs to its submission. Thereafter, the panel
announced that it would consider the two attached briefs, but
that it would not consider the other two briefs.8 ' The panel gave
no reason. Over six months later, another NGO submitted a
brief. The panel then informed the parties that it would not
take this new brief into account because it came in too late. 2 In
European Communities-Antidumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-type Bed Linen from India ("Cotton Bed Linen"), the
panel accepted a brief from a trade association, but reported it
(2000); Issues of Amicus Curiae Submissions: Note by the Editors, 3 J. INr'L ECON. L. 701
(2000).
76. Appellate Body Carbon Steel Report para. 42.
77. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Make Unfriendly Noises on "Friends of the Court"
Dispute Briefs, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Aug. 9, 2000, at C1.
78. Id.
79. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon-Recourse to Article 21.5 by Ca-
nada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS18/RW para. 7.8 (Feb. 18, 2000).
80. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, Report of the Panel, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Asbestos Panel
Report].
81. Id. para. 6.3 (suggesting that attached briefs are being considered only as at-
tachments, not as independent submissions).
82. Id. para. 6.4.
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did not take it into account."3 In December 2000, a coalition of
NGOs from several countries submitted a brief to the panel con-
sidering whether the U.S. government had complied with the
Appellate Body's Recommendation in the Shrimp-Turtle case.
Canada's appeal of its loss in the Asbestos case provided a
fresh opportunity for NGOs to make submissions. About two
weeks after the appeal commenced, the Appellate Body estab-
lished a procedure for considering briefs by private individuals
or groups.8 4 The procedure required applicants to file for leave
to file a brief. The application had to respond to a set of ques-
tions, among them the objectives and financing of the applicant
and how the proposed brief will make a contribution that is not
likely to be repetitive to what the governments have already said.
In making the announcement, the Appellate Body stated that it
was acting to promote the "interests of fairness and orderly pro-
cedure.""5 Earlier, several governments had pointed to the need
for clearer procedures regarding amicus briefs.8 6 Commentators
had also advocated adoption of working procedures.
8 7
The Appellate Body's decision apparently surprised govern-
ments and provoked a political counterattack. Egypt called a
special session of the WTO General Council where many govern-
ments vented their criticism. 8 8 Some governments (such as In-
dia) argued against the whole idea of amicus briefs. Other gov-
ernments criticized the Appellate Body for usurping the govern-
mental role in legislating dispute procedures. For example,
Uruguay complained that when the Appellate Body overruled
the Shrimp-Turtle panel, the Appellate Body should have asked
the WTO General Council for an interpretation of WTO rules
that could be applied in future cases.89 Shortly thereafter the
Appellate Body summarily rejected all seventeen of the applica-
83. European Communities-Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen
from India, Report of the Panel, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000) para. 6.1 & n.10.
84. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Prod-
ucts, Communication from the Appellate Body, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 20, 2000).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., ROBERT HOWSE & MAAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 15 (2000).
88. See LDCs Rally Against WI'O Appellate Body Bid on NGO Submissions, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 17, 2000, at 12-13; Briefs in a Twist: The WTO Ties Too Hard, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 9, 2000, at 85.
89. See Decision by the Appellate Body Concerning Amicus Curiae Briefs, Statement by
Uruguay at the General Council, WT/GC/38 (Nov. 22, 2000).
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tions for leave to submit a brief.9" According to one delegate
from a developing country, "[t]he Appellate Body seemed to
hear the message.""
In response to the form-letter rejections, several NGOs put
out a critical press statement.92 The statement complained that
the Appellate Body gave no reason for the rejections. Among
the signatories to the statement were two large environmental
NGOs, the WWF, and Greenpeace International.
The issue of amicus briefs at the WTO will continue to play
out in the months ahead. It is conceivable that one of the WTO
organs may, in effect, overrule the Appellate Body decisions that
established the opportunity for NGO submissions. Alternatively,
the Appellate Body and panels might refrain from taking NGO
briefs into account, in the expectation that NGOs will stop in-
vesting resources in writing them. If so, this would vindicate one
commentator, Jeffrey Dunoff, who has downplayed the signifi-
cance of the Appellate Body's decision in Shrimp-Turtle.93
In my view, however, the new WTO jurisprudence on ami-
cus briefs is significant.94 At the very least, it demonstrates how
NGO activism can promote a new opportunity for formal partici-
pation in governance. The DSU has no provision for the submis-
sion of amicus briefs. Yet even in the absence of such proce-
dures, NGOs decided to go ahead and submit amicus briefs any-
way.95 This episode shows how NGOs can catalyze changes in
the practices of international organizations through transna-
tional public law litigation.96 In other words, the NGOs decided
90. Amicus Brief Storm Highlights WTO's Unease with External Transparency, 4 BRIDGES,
Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 1, at http://www.ictsd.org.
91. WTO Members Warn Appellate Body on Amicus Procedures, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec.
1, 2000, at 4.
92. Press Release, The Center for International Environmental Law, A Court with-
out Friends? One Year After Seattle, the WTO Slams the Door on NGOs (Nov. 22,
2000), at http://www.ciel.org.
93. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Border Patrol at the World Trade Organization, 9 Y.B. INr'L
EWrL. L. 20 (1998).
94. Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections
on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, Harvard Jean
Monnet Working Paper Sept. 2000, at 17 (discussing the implications of the Appellate
Body's decisions on amicus briefs).
95. See Whitney Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions:
Practice and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, 32 INT'L LAw. 817, 837-38 (1998).
96. See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Interna-
tional Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (1994) (discussing NGO amicus
briefs); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
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to act as though the WTO had open procedures as a strategy for
securing such procedures. While such activist strategies have
been used in municipal public law litigation for some time, they
are unusual in an international court. To be sure, the key factor
was the willingness of the Appellate Body to be accommodating.
But so long as an independent tribunal exists, advocates can use
litigation to promote the progressive development of law.
B. WTO Symposia Involving NGOs
The recent advances by NGOs in the WTO's judicial func-
tions have not been matched in the executive and legislative
functions. The restrictive NGO Guidelines of 1996 remain in ef-
fect, and so NGOs have not been directly involved in the WTO's
work. Nevertheless, some important episodes of cooperation
have ensued.
In March 1998, the WTO Secretariat sponsored two sympo-
sia. The first was on Trade Facilitation and included corpora-
tions, business NGOs, and international organizations. The sec-
ond was on Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Develop-
ment.97 This Symposium was notable in having a broad
participation from international organizations, NGOs, corpora-
tions, foundations, academics, and law firms. Each participant
had a name card listing her organization. More than sixty gov-
ernments also sent representatives, some of whom spoke.
In March 1999, the WTO sponsored two "high level" sympo-
sia on environment and development.98 These sessions were
webcast live. Ajoint Civil Society Statement released at the sym-
posia called for "accountability [of the WTO] to parliaments and
civil society, as well as to existing international legal norms."99
Perhaps in response, several governments expressly opposed fur-
ther steps to open up the WTO to NGO input. For example,
India's Ambassador to the WTO declared that "[a] n intergovern-
mental organization like the WTO cannot effectively function if
L.J. 2599, 2626, 2656 (1997) (discussing development of international law through
NGO litigation).
97. See WIO Symposium of NGOs on Strengthening Complementarities Between Trade, En-
vironment, and Sustainable Development, at http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/sd/wtongo.html.
98. See WJO High-Level Symposia on Trade and Environment and Trade and Develop-
ment, at http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/sd/wtohls.html.
99. Joint Civil Society Statement on the WO High-Level Symposia (Mar. 1999), at http:/
/www.globalpolicy.org/cosecon/bwi-wto/wto99-2.htm.
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it has to simultaneously deal with government representatives as
well as nongovernmental representatives." 100 On the whole,
however, the interchange between governments and NGOs
proved mutually beneficial. Many participants applauded when
the renowned environmentalist Konrad von Moltke, having been
invited to sum up the environment symposium, began his re-
marks by stating that " [w] e've got to stop meeting like this." Von
Moltke then called for a legitimate ongoing relationship be-
tween NGOs and the WTO.
The issue of civil society participation was discussed at the
Ministerial Conference in Geneva in May 1998. U.S. President
Bill Clinton proposed that the WTO establish a consultative fo-
rum where business, labor, environmental, and consumer
groups could provide "regular and continuous input" to help
guide further evolution of the WTO. 1 '
On November 29, 1999, in Seattle, the WTO and the U.S.
Government sponsored a pre-Ministerial symposium for NGOs.
The program got off to a late start because of police barriers.
But in the eyes of many of the NGOs, the symposium was just a
distraction from the well-organized panels and teach-ins being
carried out by research institutes and NGOs. Many of the gov-
ernment delegates were also uninterested in the official forum.
Von Moltke had gotten it right: the WTO would either go for-
ward by deepening NGO involvement or it would fall back. But
it could not continue the broad symposia as a substitute for real
cooperation on specific issues. During 2000, the WTO Secreta-
riat did not organize any symposia.
C. Other Initiatives by the Secretariat
The WTO launched its website in 1995, and it soon became
a valuable resource for NGOs and, indeed, everyone.10 2 The
most distinctive features are full text searching of derestricted
WTO documents, rapid posting of new WTO panel and Appel-
late Body decisions, a complete database of adopted GATT panel
judgments, the texts of the WTO agreements, and a schedule of
100. Developing Countries Resist Expansion of Environment Role for World Trade Body, 22
INT'L ENV'T REP. 225, 226 (1999).
101. Pres. William J. Clinton, Remarks at the World Trade Organization in Ge-
neva, Switzerland, in 34 WKV. COMPIL. PRES. Doc. 926, 928 (1998).
102. Ruggiero Inaugurates WFO Information Service on the Internet, Press Release,
PRESS/22 (Sept. 26, 1995).
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upcoming WTO meetings. 113 The website empowers NGOs by
giving them easy access to information.
In mid-1998, then WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero
announced some additional initiatives to cooperate with
NGOs.'0 4 These included a monthly listing of NGO documents
received, a new section on the website devoted to NGO issues,
and expanded efforts by the WTO's External Relations Division
to provide briefings to NGOs.
A few weeks before the Seattle Ministerial, the Secretariat
created a web page to respond directly to outside criticisms of
the WTO. While it provides some useful information, the new
section strikes a combative tone about civil society. For example,
it explains that NGOs cannot participate directly in the WTO
and "can only exert their influence on WTO decisions through
their governments." 10 5 It also states that the WTO "shields gov-
ernments from narrow interests" such as "powerful lobbies" and
"narrow interest groups."1 6 These statements have recently
been echoed by commentators who contend that "providing
NGOs with special access [to the WTO] would undermine the
key benefits of a properly constructed international trade re-
gime-mechanisms that reduce the power of interest groups in
order to permit trade and democracy to flourish.""0 7
In February 1999, the General Council asked the Secretariat
to consider ways to promote the "institutional image" of the
WTO."' In response, the Secretariat generated a number of in-
teresting ideas, such as organizing "Model WTOs" for university-
level students along the lines of the Model U.N. The Secretariat
did not, however, advocate deeper WTO-NGO relations as a
method of improving the WTO's image.
D. Seattle Ministerial Conference
A lot has been written about the activities of civil society,
103. Id.
104. See Ruggiero Announces Expanded Wro Plan for Cooperation with NGOs, Press Re-
lease, PRESS/107 (July 16, 1998).
105. The WTO, The System Shields Governments From Narrow Interests (Feb. 22, 2001),
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/lOben_/ lObO9_e.htm.
106. Id.
107. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. Rev. 511, 571-72 (2000).
108. Promotion of the Institutional Image of the World Trade Organization, Note by the
Secretariat, WT/GC/W/158 (Apr. 14, 1999).
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and uncivil society, at Seattle.1 °9 In this brief Essay, four epi-
sodes should be noted. First, at the initiative of U.S. Senator Bill
Roth, then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, U.S.
members of Congress met with their counterpart parliamentari-
ans from other countries. This informal meeting was successful
and the participants agreed to hold a future session.11 ° The
WTO Director-General, Mike Moore, welcomed the inter-parlia-
mentary meeting.1
Second, although much of the media attention was on the
American protestors, the meeting drew many serious-minded
NGOs from around the world. For example, the Competitive
Enterprise Institute organized a worldwide coalition calling itself
"International Consumers for Civil Society" with participants
from conservative think tanks favoring freer trade. Seattle also
marked a watershed in attracting attendance by NGOs beyond
the fields of business, environment, labor, and development.
The most important newcomers included health groups (e.g.,
Medicins Sans Frontieres) and human rights groups.1 2 In total,
686 NGOs attended the Ministerial with accreditation.
Third, while environmental groups had spearheaded the in-
itial campaign for NGO participation in the trading system, by
1999 many other NGOs were making similar recommendations.
For example, The Business Roundtable proposed that once a
year, the WTO convene a meeting of business, consumer, envi-
ronment, and labor groups in order to improve communication
between the trade regime and nongovernmental stakeholders."'
Consumers International went even further and recommended
109. See, e.g., Citizens' Groups: The Non-governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratize, or
Merely Disrupt, Global Governance?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999; Sylvia Ostry, Making Sense
of It All: A Post-Mortem on the Meaning of Seattle, in SEATTLE, THE WTO, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 81-94 (Roger B. Porter & Pierre Sauv6 eds.,
2000);Jonathan Peterson, Outside Forces Change WO Forever, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at
Al; Mark Suzman, Tireless in Seattle, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at 26; Susan Tiefenbrun,
Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257
(2000).
110. See Press Release, WTO, Moore calls for closer parliamentary involvement in
WTO matters, PRESS/169 (Feb. 21, 2000).
111. See Press Release, WXTO, Moore cites role of legislators in WTO, PRESS/159
(Dec. 2, 1999).
112. See Peter Prove & Miloon Kothari, Human Rights Bodies Gear Up on TRIPS, 4
BRIDGES, July-Aug. 2000, at 13, at http://www.ictsd.org.
113. The Business Roundtable, Preparing for New WJ'O Trade Negotiations to Boost the
Economy (May 1999) at iii, 19, at http://www.brtable.org/document.cfm/321.
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that the WTO set up an accreditation system for international
NGOs. 1
4
Fourth, the Clinton Administration catalyzed the NGO ac-
tivism to some extent. In October 1999, President Clinton stated
that "if we want the world trading system to have legitimacy, we
have got to allow every legitimate group with any kind of beef,
whether they're right or wrong, to have some access to the deliber-
ative process of the WTO." I5
In November, President Clinton elaborated on this theme
and explained that:
Every group in the world with an axe to grind is going to Seat-
tle to demonstrate. I'll have more demonstrators against me
than I've had in the whole 7 years I've been President. I'm
kind of looking forward to it. I'll tell you why. I told them all
I wanted them to come. I want all the consumer groups to
come. I want all the environmental groups to come. I want
everybody who thinks this is a bad deal to come. I want every-
body to get all this out of their system and say their piece of
mind. And I want us to have a huge debate about this.
1 16
Many groups who worried that new WTO agreements would
be a bad deal did indeed come to Seattle. Yet the quality of the
ensuing debate was poor. If President Clinton really wanted the
Ministerial to succeed, then he seriously miscalculated by invit-
ing everyone to come without preparing to handle the crowds.
E. E-Transparency in 2000
After Seattle, many WTO governments realized that im-
provements were needed both in the WTO's internal decision-
making and in its external relations. The former is now called
"I-Transparency" and the latter "E-Transparency." Director-Gen-
eral Moore has worked hard on both. On E-Transparency, one
of his most important initiatives has been to strengthen the Sec-
114. CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL, CONSUMER RIGHTS AND THE MULTILATERAL TRAD-
ING SYSTEM: WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE BEFORE A MILLENNIUM ROUND 9 (1999).
115. Remarks at the Democratic Leadership Council Gala, White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2027 (Oct. 13, 1999).
116. Remarks in a Roundtable Discussion with Harley-Davidson Employees in York, Penn-
sylvania, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2321 (Nov. 10, 1999). President Clinton made
similar remarks at George Washington University. Remarks in an On-Line Townhall Meet-
ing, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2293 (1999).
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retariat's External Relations staff, which interacts with NGOs on
a daily basis.
In November 2000, the General Council discussed external
transparency." 7 No decisions were taken, but several govern-
ments argued against allowing any deeper involvement by
NGOs. For example, Hong Kong contended that direct partici-
pation of civil society in the WTO was not desirable because it
would risk "politicising the operations of the Organization due
to sectoral and electoral interests."" 8 Colombia explained that
"at the level of the multilateral system," it was important that
"the necessary state responsibility is maintained over positions
and proposals." On the other hand, a few governments called
for doing more to increase E-transparency. Canada proposed
opening the WTO Trade Policy Reviews to accredited observ-
ers." 9 Canada also advocated experiments to test other forms of
transparency, such as (1) holding small dialogues among gov-
ernments, academics, and NGOs to tackle focused issues, and
(2) authorizing the Secretariat to create advisory boards for is-
sues like E-commerce. The United States called for greater
transparency in WTO dispute settlement and suggested that the
lack of openness makes it harder to settle disputes. 2 °
In October 2000, Australia asked the WTO to circulate two
nongovernmental statements advocating greater liberalization in
agricultural trade, a position consistent with that of the Austra-
lian government.' 2' The statements came from the Cairns
Group Farm Leaders and the Global Alliance for Sugar Trade
Reform and Liberalization. The Cairns Group Farms Leaders
are agricultural associations in eleven countries spanning North
America, Central America, South America, East Asia, and South
117. The General Council also discussed the WTO-NGO relationship in July 1998.
General Council, Minutes of Meeting, WT/GC/M/29 (July 15, 16 & 22, 1998).
118. External Transparency, General Principles, Communication from Hong Kong,
China, WT/GC/W/418 (Oct. 31, 2000). It is unclear whether Hong Kong was sug-
gesting that the W17O be impervious to the results of national elections.
119. See External Transparency, Informal Paper by Canada, WT/GC/W/415 (Oct.
17, 2000).
120. General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency, Submission
from the United States, WT/GC/W/413/Rev.] (Oct. 13, 2000).
121. Cairns Group Farm Leaders Presentation to Cairns Group Ministers, Communica-
tion from Australia, WT/L/368 (Oct. 30, 2000). See also Global Alliance for Sugar Trade
Reform and Liberalisation, Communication from Australia, WT/L/367 (Oct. 30, 2000).
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Africa. They share a joint interest in securing better WTO agri-
cultural rules.
In November 2000, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy
gave a thoughtful speech about the WTO in which he pointed
out that "[t]he internet has made the market for political ideas
contestable" and that this enables NGOs to engage in
"borderless, real time networking." 122 As a result, he said, policy-
makers have lost any monopoly in setting the international trade
agenda, if they ever had one. Lamy did not discuss the implica-
tions of this insight for the organization of the WTO except to
call for a broad public debate involving "policy-makers at various
levels of governance (national, regional and global), parliamen-
tarians, business, trade unions, [and] NGOs."
In late 1999 and throughout 2000, Director-General Moore
used his speeches to articulate the institutional underpinnings of
the WTO and its relationship to the public. He explained that
"the WTO is not a supranational government," but rather an or-
ganization whose decisions are, made by Member States and
whose agreements are ratified by parliaments. '12 Furthermore,
he claimed that the WTO is a democratic process. Indeed, "what
could be more democratic than sovereign governments in-
structing Ambassadors to reach agreements that are then ac-
cepted by cabinets and parliaments? ' 124 In his view, the "WTO is
member driven;" its "base constituency must be the nation
state. '12 5 Yet in some of his speeches, Mr. Moore has lifted the
government veil to consider the people within. For example, he
hypothesized that "[i]f the WTO did not exist, people would be
crying out for a forum where governments could negotiate rules,
ratified by national parliaments, that promote freer trade and
provide a transparent and predictable framework for busi-
ness."126 In another speech, he declared that "[o]ur mission
must be to ensure that people and Parliaments own us, that the
122. Pascal Lamy, Challenges Confronting the World Trade System Today, EUR. FOREIGN
AFF. REV., Nov. 8, 2000.
123. Press Release, WTO, The WTO is Not a World Government and No One Has
Any Intention of Making It One, Moore Tells NGOs, Press/155 (Nov. 29, 1999).
124. Mike Moore, Challenges for the Global Trading System in the New Millennium,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Sept. 28, 1999.
125. Press Release, supra note 110.
126. Mike Moore, The Backlash Against Globalization, Address before Liberal In-
ternational, Ottawa (Oct. 26, 2000)
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people are the masters of globalization and not the servants. 12 7
Noting that the WTO had already approved four new Members
in 2000, Moore boasted that "[a] few thousand protesters may
demonstrate - against the WTO, but 18 million people have
joined the WTO this year." 128
My survey of recent developments ends in December 2000.
The next parts of this Essay provide a normative discussion of
the two sides of the WTO/NGO debate. As we will see, Moore's
speeches offer some support to both Statists and Individualists.
III. THE STATIST PERSPECTIVE: KEEPING THE
WTO CLOSED
Part III lays out one side of the debate by summarizing the
arguments for why the WTO should remain closed to greater
engagement with NGOs. It is termed the "Statist" perspective,
because it presents the view that the WTO is an organization of
Member States who are each the exclusive spokesman for the
individuals who comprise them.129 My presentation of the Statist
perspective is stylized; it is a composite of what Statists say about
the WTO. Note that the term "Statist" is a bit inapposite for the
WTO in that it is open to, and has members that are, neither
States nor U.N. Members-at present, the European Communi-
ties, Hong Kong, and Macau. 130 Nevertheless, Statist will be used
here for want of a better descriptor.
The Statist perspective sees a sharp distinction between the
national and global levels of decision-making. At the national
level, individuals are free to voice their interests within the politi-
cal and legal systems of each country. Such processes of plural-
ism are appropriate in a national democracy to supplement the
formal methods of voting. But at the global (or international)
level, no polity exists. The idea of "The People" is specific to a
nation. So, at the global level one can speak of "the peoples of
127. Mike Moore, Statement to the 1 th International Military Chiefs of Chaplains
Conference (Feb. 9, 2000).
128. WTO, Moore Cites Improved Climate for Trade Talks, LINK FOUNDATION, Nov. 6,
2000.
129. See GaRY P. SAMPSON, TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE WTO: THE POST-SEAYtLE
AGENDA 13 (2000) (stating that because WTO is an intergovernmental organization,
member governments "are presumed to be acting on behalf of the collective interests of
their diverse constituents").
130. WTO Agreement art. XII(1). Current membership in the WTO is available at
http://www.wto.org.
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the United Nations" but not the people of the world.
1 3
'
Because the global level is different from the national level,
many of the governance concepts we think about nationally have
no relevance internationally. For example, citizenship exists
only at the national level. More fundamentally, democracy has
little meaning outside of a nation because democracy presup-
poses a demos (or people), and at the global level no demos
exists.13 Martin Wolf takes this view to its extreme by asserting
that "[a] s an agreement among states, the WTO itself cannot be
democratic."'3 3
No WTO diplomat or civil servant would say it that bluntly.
Rather, Director-General Moore and others insist that the WTO
is democratic, yet achieves this in an indirect rather than direct
way. The WTO is accountable to the people transitively, by be-
ing accountable to government Members who are themselves ac-
countable to their citizens. Conversely, the WTO has legitimacy
as a decision maker because the people in each country elect
their government, and those governments collectively manage
the WTO. Furthermore, because the WTO acts through consen-
sus, no government has to accept a change in rules that it does
not agree to. So citizens are protected against supranational de-
cisions being imposed on a government without its consent.
As a functional international organization, the WTO is not
endowed with the full competences of its Members. On the con-
trary, the WTO is set up with a specialized mandate and can only
do what the governments authorize it to. So an NGO has no
basis for expecting the same opportunities (or rights) for partici-
pation at the WTO in Geneva as the NGO currently enjoys with
its government at home.
The Statist perspective does not deny that nongovernmental
interests in one country may want to influence another. As the
GATT Secretariat explained in 1992, "there is nothing under
customary international law and practices that would prevent
nongovernmental organizations in one country from actively dif-
fusing their environmental ideas to residents of other countries,
131. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
132. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 615-17 (1999).
133. Martin Wolf, Of Tuna, Turtles and Red Herrings: Concern About the Environment,
Labour Rights or Even Democracy Have Little to do With Global Commerce, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1999, at 27.
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so as to create popular support for changes in environmental
policies.' 34 The Statist argument is narrower: Nongovernmen-
tal interests have no place in an intergovernmental organization.
For instance, Alan Oxley argues that "[t] he WTO is... the busi-
ness of governments. There is no scope or logic to giving non-
state parties a role in a process which tests commitments among
state parties."' 1
35
Nongovernmental interests must be communicated solely to
one's own government. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye ex-
plain (in critiquing this view), the WTO "club model" perceives
"the nation state as a hierarchy, so that individuals within each
state only interact politically with people in other states through
their governments."' 36 Each State is a hierarchy or pyramid, and
inter-governmental negotiations take place through an exclusive
communications network which links the top of the pyramids.
Thus, an NGO seeking to influence an international negotiation
(or an international organization) has only one channel for do-
ing so, its own government.1 7 In other words, the national level
of government has responsibility for taking into account the dif-
ferent elements of public interest which are brought to bear on
trade policymaking.138
Given this channel of participation at home, a process that
gives NGOs a voice in Geneva would be unprincipled.139  It
would give the NGO "two bites of the apple," one at home and
one at the WTO.'4 ° Yet like everyone else, the NGO is entitled
134. GATT, 1 INT'L TRADE 90-91, at 34 (1992).
135. Alan Oxley, Poor Environmental Policy: The Fundamental Problem in the "Trade
and Environment" Debate, in THE NEXT TRADE NEGOTIATING ROUND: EXAMINING THE
AGENDA FOR SEATrLE 63, 69 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1999).
136. Robert 0. Keohane &Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation
and the WFO: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, (May 2000), at http://www.ksg.
harvard.edu/cbg/trade/papers.
137. Of course, an NGO may not perceive any government as its own. The NGO
has no right to vote.
138. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
139. SeeJonathan Fried, Globalization and International Law-Some Thoughts for States
and Citizens, 23 QUEEN'S L.J. 259, 274 (1997); see also Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereign-
tists, 79 FOR. Arr. 9, 12 (Nov.-Dec. 2000) (pointing out how critics of unaccountability of
international organizations assert that NGO participation makes it even worse).
140. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, I CHI. J. INT'L L.
205, 217 (2000) ("Civil society's 'second bite at the apple' raises profoundly troubling
questions of democratic theory that its advocates have almost entirely elided."). See also
Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT'L AFF., Jan. 2001, at 1, 29
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to just one bite.141 Far from enhancing democracy, two-bite par-
ticipation would undermine it. 1 42 An NGO whose view is being
advocated by its government would have little reason to partici-
pate, so perforce it is only the NGOs articulating minority inter-
ests who want to use their voice. But those ideas are illegitimate
because they were already rejected through the domestic demo-
cratic process.1 43 Allowing unelected NGOs to say things in Ge-
neva that contradict what the elected representatives (or their
agents) say is anti-democratic because countries must speak with
one voice. As John Bolton has argued, "the civil society idea ac-
tually suggests a corporativist approach to international decision-
making that is dramatically troubling for democratic theory be-
cause it posits interests (whether NGOs or businesses) as legiti-
mate actors along with popularly elected governments.' 44
The Statists view transnational interests as just a basket of
distinct national interests. Thus, no channel to an international
organization is offered for transnational interests like free trade.
A transnational NGO, such as the ICC, is told, in effect, to disag-
gregate its identity and message.
The Statist view is presented a-historically. No effort is
made to reconcile the dogma with the long history of active
NGO involvement with international organizations. Some re-
cent examples of this phenomenon are the groups Reporters
Without Borders and the older Medicins Sans Frontires. For
example, soon after it was established in 1920, the ICC worked
with bodies in the League of Nations to write trade rules.'45 Sev-
("To give NGOs a second shot independent of the governments which they have
elected has no rationale.").
141. The apple metaphorists are apparently not troubled by the waste in apples.
142. Thomas M.T. Niles, Protest Aimed at the Wrong Target, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999,
at 18 (arguing that Seattle protest was disregard for principles of democratic govern-
ance).
143. See, e.g., Martin Wolf, Uncivil Society, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1999, at-14 ("If NGOs
were indeed representative of the wishes and desires of the electorate, those who em-
brace their ideas would be in power. Self-evidently, they are not."); David Robertson,
Civil Society and the WFO, 23 WORLD ECON. 1119, 1126 (2000) ("But the NGOs really
want a second bite at the negotiating cherry; to participate in trade negotiations after
their lobbying has failed to influence governments.").
144. Bolton, supra note 140, at 218.
145. See GEORGE L. RIDGEWAY, MERCHANTS OF PEACE: TWENTY YEARS OF BUSINESS
DIPLOMACY THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1919-1938, AT 21-31
(1938); DENYS P. MYERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 166 (1935) (discussing
the ICC's initiative to promote an international convention making bribery a crime).
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eral decades later, the ICC worked with organs in GATT as noted
above.146 In 1997, the ICC asked for an "official dialogue" with
the WT.a 147" The Statists cannot account for these customary
practices, and so ignore them.
The Statists recognize that NGOs are currently involved in
other international organizations, but they have an answer for
why that experience should not be followed in the WTO. The
answer is WTO Exceptionalism, the idea that the WTO is differ-
ent from other international organizations.' 48 The WTO, it is
said, is a rule-based organization with running negotiations and
enforcement of contractual obligations. By contrast, the United
Nations is a power-based organization with few rules and little
enforcement. When pressed, the Statists will admit that the U.N.
system does have negotiations, rules, and enforcement, but the
WTO is said to differ because it is more effective.
The argument that NGOs should be excluded from the
WTO because it is effective is in tension with another central
argument of the Statists-namely, that the WTO does not di-
rectly affect people. If WTO decisions did affect the individ-
ual-for example, food safety-then the Statist view would be
vulnerable to the argument that an individual affected by a deci-
sion in Geneva should have an opportunity to influence it. So
the Statists insist that the WTO does not directly touch the indi-
vidual. WTO rules are addressed to governments who have the
final say on how to behave. While it is admitted that domestic
NGOs can influence their own government's decision in joining
the WTO and in complying with its rules, the Statists sometimes
deny the converse: that WTO supervision of governments affects
individuals. The Statists walk a thin line in explaining how the
WTO can be much more effective than other international orga-
nizations while not actually affecting people. Even the WTO
website admits that the WTO affects people by shielding their
governments from narrow interest groups. 4
NGO participation at the WTO is opposed for instrumental
146. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
147. See Bruce Barnard, Business Group Wants Special Role in WTO, J. COM., Mar. 5,
1997, at 3A.
148. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 381 (2000) (contrasting trade agreements to human rights and regula-
tory agreements).
149. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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reasons. The Statists claim that the presence of NGOs would
make it harder for WTO member governments to reach a con-
sensus. The negotiating process works because each govern-
ment presents a unitary view and then bargains with others that
have different views.15° Were NGOs allowed to observe and
make comments, the negotiations would get bollixed. That is
because NGO participation would expose the unitary view as a
fiction. For example, it would be harder for a delegate to say
that "the United States thinks X" when NGOs in the room retort
that public opinion in the United States actually supports "Not
X." Another problem is that the mindset of the GATT/WTO-
that a trade negotiation is deal making among economic nation-
alists-would be challenged by NGOs who seek market-oriented
solutions to global problems. 1
In summary, the Statist perspective is a mix of formalism
and instrumentalism. The WTO is formally an organization of
governments and should so remain. Yet even if all member gov-
ernments wanted to admit NGOs, they should resist because the
ensuing practices would undermine the effectiveness of the trad-
ing system in shielding governments from domestic pressure
groups.
IV. THE INDIVDUALIST PERSPECTIVE: OPENING THE WTO
Part IV presents the other side of the debate by summariz-
ing the arguments for why the WTO should open up to greater
consultation and cooperation with NGOs. It is termed the "Indi-
vidualist" perspective because it presents the view that, as an
agency of global governance, the WTO should maintain a vital
connection to the individuals who inhabit the planet. The Indi-
vidualist perspective recognizes the distinction between the na-
tional and international levels of decision-making, but contends
that both are appropriate for participation by individuals and
their voluntary associations.152
Consider, briefly, the proposition that governments are not
150. SeeJeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1
J. INT'L ECON. L. 433, 438-39 (1998) (discussing and critiquing this view).
151. See GATT art. XXVIII(3) bis (stating that tariff negotiations shall take into
account needs of governments and individual industries, and needs of developing coun-
tries for more flexible use of tariff protection to assist economic development).
152. See Florentino P. Feliciano, Jenks, the Common Law of Mankind, 68 YALE L.J.
1039, 1046, 1047 (1959) (visualizing the world as a graduated series of community con-
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free to establish international organizations totally shut off from
the public. Such closed organizations could contradict both na-
tional and international law. At the national level, one might ask
whether a democratic government-which respects the core
rights of association, assembly, and petition-can bind itself to
recognize the authority of a treaty and international agency in
which these core rights are denied to individuals. 153 At the inter-
national level, one might ask whether consultation with NGOs
has become customary for international organizations and part
of their international personality.
154
This line of argument is superfluous, however, because the
WTO treaty already states that " [t] he General Council may make
appropriate arrangements, for consultation and cooperation with
non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related
to those of the WTO. 1 5 5 This provision is based on a similar
one from the Charter of the International Trade Organization
of 1948.156 The 1948 provision expanded upon the U.N. Char-
ter of 1945, which provides that the Economic and Social Coun-
cil "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters
within its competence. 1 57 Thus, the founders of the trading sys-
tem went beyond the formal U.N. model to explicitly seek coop-
eration with NGOs.
Therefore, the real issue is not whether NGOs should re-
ceive recognition from the WTO, but rather what forms of con-
sultation and cooperation are appropriate. This issue is complex
because one must consider all three functions (or branches) of
the WTO-the legislative, executive, and judicial.1 58 Although
the WTO's executive and legislative decisions normally require
texts and noting participation of pressure groups, private associations, and individuals).
Justice Feliciano is a member of the WATO Appellate Body.
153. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the
International Economic Law Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FoR.EIN AFF. 185, 215-16
(1997-98).
154. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gov-
ernance, 18 U. MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997).
155. WTO Agreement art. V(2) (emphasis added).
156. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
157. U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
158. The legislative functions take place in the Ministerial Conference and in the
General Council. See WTO Agreement arts.. IV, IX, X, XII. The executive functions
take place in the various councils, committees, bodies, as well as through the Director-
General and the Secretariat. See WTO Agreement arts. IV, VI, VII, IX. The judicial
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consensus (which might mean that the decision is taken in each
national capital), the adoption of dispute settlement judgments
occurs without a consensus. 159
In deciding what modes of cooperation are appropriate,
governments are being hindered by verbal barriers. Phrases like
"NGOs should be able to participate" or "NGOs deserve a seat at
the table" are ambiguous in English and probably equally con-
fusing in other languages. Thus, at least some of the conflict
about NGOs may result from verbal misunderstanding rather
than real disagreement.
With sufficient discourse, it might be possible to gain a con-
sensus among WTO governments on the following three pro-
positions. First, although WTO rules and decisions are applied
only to members, they do in fact affect people. Second, the
WTO needs to attain broader public support and improving the
dialogue between governments and NGOs may be one way of
achieving this. Third, no government or mainstream civil society
organization is suggesting that NGOs be given a vote in the
WTO, and therefore, opposition to that hypothetical NGO role
should not be used as an excuse to oppose appropriate consulta-
tion and cooperation. 160 Of course, even with these three pro-
positions as a foundation, WTO members will still disagree on
whether consultation should occur solely with governments or
also with the WTO.
The case for allowing the WTO to hear nongovernmental
interests is strong. When individuals are affected by an official
decision, they ought to be able to have input into the decision-
making at the level where the decision is being made.161 The
functions take place in the Appellate Body and the panels. See WTO Agreement art. III.
See generally DSU.
159. See DSU art. 17.14 (adoption of Appellate Body report unless there is consen-
sus not to adopt); WTO Agreement arts. IX, X (non-consensual decision-making). For
a good chart on WTO decision-making, see Richard Blackhurst, The Capacity of the WTO
To Fulfill Its Mandate, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 31, 57 (Anne 0.
Krueger ed., 1998).
160. Some analysts have suggested broader NGO roles beyond offering advice.
For example, Graham Dunkley points to the possibility of using the model of the Inter-
national Labor Organization for the WTO so that nations would be represented at the
WTO not only by governments, but also by employers, labor unions, and NGOs. See
GRAHAM DUNKLEY, THE FREE TRADE ADVENTURE: THE WTO, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND
GLOBALIsM-A CRITIQUE 261-62 (2000).
161. See Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 709, 730 (1998) ("NGOs can also help to ensure that
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claim that governments set their WTO policies at home ignores
the fact that key decisions in the WTO emerge as a result of face-
to-face negotiations between governments. Obviously, the best
way to influence such negotiations is to be in the room (if not at
the table). It may be true in some countries that amendments to
the WTO treaty have to be approved by a parliament or con-
gress. Such parliamentary votes, however, will happen too late
for an NGO that wants to shape the results. An NGO can fight
against ratification, but that will usually be ineffective to achieve
the NGO's constructive policy goals. Moreover, in view of the
growing economic importance of WTO membership, no country
is likely to reject ratification of new WTO agreements.
What NGOs typically want is to increase intergovernmental
cooperation. Support merely from one's own government will
rarely be sufficient for achieving an NGO's international
goals.162 This is especially true in the WTO, which needs a con-
sensus of governments, to make a decision.
As noted in Parts II and III, some governments and com-
mentators argue that NGO views should be channeled exclu-
sively through governments. But often, an NGO cannot rely
upon a government to communicate its views. 1 6 3 An NGO for
free trade may gain little help from a government pursuing mer-
cantilist or protectionist trade policies. The NGO's dissonant
views will be filtered out. An NGO located in a small, developing
country may get little support from a government that cannot
afford to send a permanent representative to the WTO. Even
the public both feels connected to and actually is connected to these most distantly
made decisions [at the WTO]."); GORDON SMITH & Moists NAM, ALTERED STATES:
GLOBALIZATION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND GOVERNANCE XV (2000) ("People are entitled by right
to some meaningful say in the institutions that govern their lives, be it their own legisla-
ture or the World Trade Organization.").
162. Wolfgang Benedek, Developing the Constitutional Order of the WTO-The Role of
NGOs, in DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF KONRAD GINTHER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 65TH BIRTHDAY 228, 232 (Wolf-
gang Benedek et al. eds., 1999) (explaining that representation of NGOs by state does
not satisfy their interests in participation because their concerns are not satisfactorily
taken care of on state level).
163. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Outreach at the WFO: Outreach to Civil Society, in
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 98, 102 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee
Chambers eds., 1999) ("One of the most important advances in political theory in re-
cent decades is the growing understanding that interactions among people cannot all
be mediated through the narrow channels of governments, particularly national gov-
ernments.").
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more problematic, an NGO might be located in countries like
China and Russia that have not yet been admitted as WTO Mem-
bers. What channels should those 1.4 billion people use to com-
municate with the WTO?
At the national level, a citizen does not exhaust his demo-
cratic participation by what he does alone in the voting booth.
He lobbies, serves on advisory groups, circulates petitions, testi-
fies at public hearings, and participates in "town meetings."
These are a manifestation of democracy, not a distortion of de-
mocracy. 164
If a citizen can rightly be an activist within local and na-
tional government, why should one forego that in international
governance? 6 ' Since no one can exit from the Earth, the only
way to influence world order decisions is through citizen voice-
vertically through one's own government or diagonally to other
governments.166 Diagonal discourse can also operate through
NGOs in other countries.1 6
7
The idea that an NGO should speak only through its gov-
ernment has an even deeper problem. Many NGOs concerned
about the WTO's activities engage in transnational relation-
ships. 6' This is not surprising. Throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries, individuals responded to international problems by
setting up transnational NGOs.' 69 This extranational activism
reaches across political borders to find like-minded individuals
in other countries who will work together to influence govern-
ments and international organizations. (One current' example
of this phenomenon is the group Medicins Sans Frontieres.)
For the WTO to send transnational environmental groups or
164. See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).
165. See Jenny Bates, Civil Society and the World Trade Organization: A Voice, Not a
Vote, Progressive Policy Institute Backgrounder (Nov. 1999), at http://www.dlcppi.org/
texts/trade.
166. See Albert 0. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 209 (1970) (comparing
options of exit to voice).
167. Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Com-
mons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1,
71 (1999) (discussing diagonal discourse).
168. Transnational relationships are those that are "formed in the world space be-
yond the framework of the national state and that are at least partially free of the con-
trol or mediating action of states." PIERRE S. PETrIGREW, THE NEW POLITICS OF CONFI-
DENCE 24 (1998). Pettigrew is Canada's Minister for International Trade.
169. See CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL OR-
GANIZATIONS SINCE 1875, at 14 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999).
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business groups down (or back) to their "own" governments is
tantamount to denigrating the causes they espouse. Daniel Esty
put it well when he said that "[t]elling these groups that they
must exert influence only at the national level is to deprive them
of their transnational essence."'17 °
Because key WTO policies are being determined both in na-
tional capitals and in Geneva, it is logical for a transnational
NGO, like WWF, to operate simultaneously at both levels. This is
not taking two bites of the apple. Rather, it is biting into two
different apples, national and global. 71
Although the Statists claim that NGOs who want to influ-
ence the WTO should go out and win national elections, that
argument is sterile. Elections are much more about picking poli-
ticians than about deciding issues.17 2 Even when the WTO is dis-
cussed in an election campaign, this issue is likely to be on a
third or lower tier. So the fact that an individual is frustrated
with WTO policies does not imply that the individual's preferred
candidate lost the most recent election. One can vote for the
winning candidate and still be disappointed in the decisions he
makes regarding the WTO (or the decisions made by his agents,
the trade bureaucrats).
Furthermore, even if an idea is voted down in one country,
that should not necessarily put the idea to rest. An NGO in
Country A could develop an idea that A's public opposes yet the
rest of the world would favor. If the NGO were able to offer this
idea to the WTO, then the other governments might bargain
with Government A to accept it. To be sure, speaking at the
WTO is not the only way for an NGO to present its idea. The
170. Daniel C. Esty, Nongovernmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization:
Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 123, 141 (1998).
171. Thus I disagree with Mark Halle who writes:
If trade policy in all WTO member countries were crafted through a fully par-
ticipatory process where the views of each legitimate stakeholder were listened
to, weighed, and given their due importance, and if each of the WTO Mem-
bers was a model of democracy and good governance, the work of WTO could
by and large be left to the governments on their own. There would be no
burning case for civil society involvement.
Mark Halle, Legitimacy: the New Frontier, 3 BRIDGES, Mar. 1999, at 13. Even with perfectly
representative governments, there would still be a need for NGO involvement to help
governments reach the optimal collective decision at the international level.
172. For example, in the U.S. presidential election of 2000, far more media atten-
tion was devoted to how the candidates wanted to handle uncounted ballots in Florida
than to what the candidates were saying about any policy issue.
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NGO's chairman can write an op-ed. But the unpopularity of an
idea in its country of origin should not bar it from intergovern-
mental discourse.
A nation of individuals does not need to speak with one
voice to other nations. Each nation has a government, however,
and those governments should speak with one voice to each
other. Of course, governments often fail in this regard due to
well-known agency problems. Even when governments do speak
to each other in perfect modulation, there will be numerous
sidebar conversations between individuals of different nations
that will express disagreement with one or more governments.
Very frequently, individuals of one nation will converse with gov-
ernment officials of another, nation. So long as an individual
does not falsely purport to speak for his national government,
these everyday conversations are unproblematic.
As noted in Part II, Philip Nichols seeks a "rational basis" for
NGO participation at the WTO.' 73 The answer is simple: gov-
ernments are imperfect. While governments have a monopoly
on the legal use of coercive power, they do not have a monopoly
on good ideas for achieving the goals set out in the Preamble of
the WTO Agreement such as "raising standards of living," "en-
suring full employment," and eliminating "discriminatory treat-
ment in international trade relations."
Thus, governments at the WTO can make that organization
more effective by welcoming the ideas of individuals and their
NGOs1 74 In making this claim, I am not suggesting that bureau-
crats are bereft of good ideas.. Nor am I ignoring the fact that
bureaucrats and politicians regularly adopt ideas incubated by
an NGO. All I am saying is that at every level where governmen-
tal decisions are taken, there should be ,a process for hearing
from nongovernmental interests.
1 75
173. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
174. C. Fred Bergsten, Managing the World Economy of the Future, in MANAGING THE
WORLD ECONOMY 341, 373 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994);Jessica Wilson, Why Does the WTO
Need Civil Society, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: VIEWS FROM
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA, A READER 85 (Peider K6nz ed., 2000).
175. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 416
(2000) ("Interest groups are important manifestations of political attention and activity
that should be channeled, not blocked. As the locus of political decision-making in-
creasingly shifts upwards, away from the state and toward the international level, rules
and processes should be adjusted to permit interest groups to follow suit."); Andrea K.
Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade Orga-
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In an important contribution to the debate, Daniel Esty ex-
plains the value of promoting more intellectual "competition" at
the WTO:
In an ideal world, governments might be expected to re-eval-
uate their policies regularly and then be positioned to bring
fresh thinking to the fore, making a prominent NGO unnec-
essary. But in the real world, governmental inertia is over-
whelming. . . . An NGO-enriched WTO decision process
would offer better competition for national governments in
the search for optimal policies.1 76
Optimal policies will not necessarily emerge from a vibrant
marketplace of ideas at the WTO. The initial effect may be in-
formation overload or political gridlock. But the solution can
hardly be to keep a narrow bandwidth on the communications
channel.
-The call for.a more competitive debate at the WTO needs to
be distinguished from the contention that the rational basis for
NGO -participation is to represent interests. To point out that in-
dividuals or NGOs have interests (or self-interests) is to state a
tautology. But there is an important difference between hearing
those interests as ideas or values and hearing from NGOs as the
representative of a bloc of people. In democratic countries, in-
dividuals choose their representatives by voting, and these
elected officials (and their agents) have the competence to re-
present the full public at the WTO. 17 7 So seeking to represent
political minorities or the locally disenfranchised is not the func-
tion that the NGO should serve.
By viewing NGOs as policy entrepreneurs rather than for-
mal representatives, many of the practical problems of accom-
'modating NGO participation diminish.. If an NGO does not
claim to be speaking for a segment of the population, then there
is no need to examine its charter, scrutinize its contributors, and
nizations, 19 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 587, 635 (1998) (noting that in international orga-
nizations that produce results, the importance of private actors becomes more compel-
ling).
176. Esty, supra note 170, at 136-37. See also Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin,
Regulatory Co-opetition, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 235, 253-54 (2000) (discussing extra-govern-
mental co-opetition to generate winning ideas).
177. See MICHAEL EDWARDS, NGO RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 21 (2000) ("[T]he
best representative of civil society is a democratically elected government, comple-
mented by checks and balances provided by non-state membership bodies such as labor
unions and pressure groups of different kinds.").
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verify its membership list. The value of an NGO's input is its
ideas. As Jeffrey Dunoff observes, "to the extent that NGO argu-
ments are meritorious, it should not matter whether they are
representative or electorally accountable.
17s
Furthermore, the WTO can gain more than information
from NGOs. Nonstate actors can also promote compliance with
WTO rules and help educate the public about the WTO and
trade. 179 In addition, NGOs are less likely to object to WTO ac-
tions when the decision-making process allows them to have
their say, even when they do not get their way.
180
Given all these reasons for NGO involvement, why do many
countries oppose it? Actually, countries do not. It is the govern-
ments in power that are opposing greater consultation and coop-
eration between the WTO and NGOs. At the risk of over genera-
lizing, it seems that many of these governments, particularly
from developing countries, are worried that NGO participation
will diminish their sovereignty. In assessing these claims, one
should consider sovereignty in its external and internal dimen-
sions. External sovereignty today, as Abram and Antonia Han-
dler Chayes have explained, is really about "status" or "the vindi-
cation of the state's existence as a member of the international
system."181 Internal sovereignty refers to the authority structure
within a State and to the effectiveness of its control.
18 2
Both types of sovereignty can be challenged by NGOs. The
delegate who represents a developing country at the WTO may
178. Dunoff, supra note 150, at 439.
179. See Christophe Bellmann & Richard Gerster, Accountability in the World Trade
Organization, J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1996, at 31, 32 ("NGO participation is not a threat
to the WTO and trade diplomacy, but contributes to securing public support for trade
in view of sustainable development."); Mark Edward Foster, Trade and Environment:
Making Room for Environmental Trade Measures within the GATT, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 393,
441-42 (1998) (discussing how NGOs can call attention to disguised protectionism); Jan
Aart Scholte et al., The WTO and Civil Society, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1999, at 107, 111
(noting that civil society can influence ratification of WTO trade agreements).
180. Cf Keohane & Nye, supra note 136 (noting that "any sustainable pattern of
governance will have to institutionalize channels of contact between international orga-
nizations and constituencies within civil society").'
181. ABRAM CtAYms & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTYv 27
(1995). The authors call this the "new" sovereignty in contrast to the old definition of
sovereignty as "the complete autonomy of the state to act as it chooses, without legal
limitation by any superior entity." Id. at 26.
182. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY. ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9-10 (1999). Kras-
ner posits four meanings of sovereignty-domestic (here termed internal), interdepen-
dence, international legal, and Westphalian.
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be embarrassed by his country's lack of economic and political
power, but knows that it has sovereign equality as a WTO Mem-
ber and that he is the representative of that country. But the
value of that status (and his status) can be watered down by
NGO participation. The delegate from Country X may despise
competition from the more articulate NGO spokesperson from
Country X. Internal sovereignty can also be challenged by
NGOs. David Robertson has analyzed NGO strategies for the
WTO and found that NGOs seek to submit an amicus brief to a
panel hoping that it will foster the creation of international
law.183 Such law then becomes "the ammunition that NGOs use
to brow-beat national governments."184 This makes it difficult
for governments to exercise "sovereignty against NGO-promoted
public outcries."' 85
The NGO challenge to internal sovereignty can be particu-
larly acute in non-democratic countries. Although a bare major-
ity of WTO member governments are free and democratic,
thirty-two percent are rated "Partially Free" by Freedom House
and seventeen percent are rated "Not Free."' 86 These latter two
groups of WTO member governments may be horrified at the
idea of giving a domestic NGO greater opportunities for partici-
pation at the INTO than it has at home because the NGO may
use this experience to show the backwardness of its government.
In summary, Individualists say that the world trading system
is too important to leave to trade technocrats. The WNTO Agree-
ment has a provision allowing NGO involvement, but so far gov-
ernments have opted for shallow participation. If they move for-
ward to provide more opportunities, governments may improve
public understanding of and support for the WTO. 187 Opening
the WTO to NGOs will not change the character of the WTO.
Director-General Moore's statement that 18 million people
'joined" the WTO in 2000, while intriguing, is not correct."8 8
183. See Robertson, supra note 143, at 1127.
184. Id.
185. Robertson, supra note 143, at 1128.
186. Based on data compiled from the WrO website (141 member countries) and
the Freedom House website. Thanks to Mindy Charnovitz for doing these tabulations.
187. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From "Negative" to "Positive" Integration in the WTO:
Time for "Mainstreaming Human Rights" Into WTO Law?, 37 COMMON MARKET L. REV.
1363, 1373 (2000) (suggesting that a civil society advisory committee to the WTO might
induce more public support for WTO negotiations).
188. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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The WTO does not have citizens. NGOs will enjoy only a con-
sultative status.
Although I side with the Individualists in this debate, I agree
that the narrow Statist perspective has coherence. Yet the cur-
rent posture of Statists is ironic. To keep NGOs out of the WTO,
the political conservatives glorify Leviathan over the individual.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
All governments-whether national or international-re-
quire statism. So the choice we face is not statism versus individ-
ualism as absolutes, but rather how to alloy these two principles
in each organization. Should the WTO move away from its state-
centrism and toward greater respect for the individual? In the
author's view, the answer is yes. Economic nationalism and pro-
tectionism are deeply rooted, and so providing opportunities for
civil society groups to challenge these practices can help the
World Trade Organization use trade to achieve a better World.
Consultation and cooperation with NGOs should occur in
all three branches of the WTO. Because the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial functions differ, appropriate modalities need to
be tailored for each branch. Some suggestions are offered be-
low.
A. Legislative
The key legislative activities of the WTO are the Ministerial
Conferences, the General Council, and trade negotiations. The
government officials who attend the Ministerial Conference are
trade ministers who are sometimes elected to parliament within
their country but are usually appointed by elected officials. Cur-
rently, the WTO permits NGOs to be silent observers at Ministe-
rial Conferences, and that may be sufficient. If the Seattle exper-
iment of having a parallel inter-parliamentary meeting is re-
peated in the future, the parliamentarians could hold WTO
oversight hearings and invite NGOs to testify.
The WIO needs to provide a channel for NGO input into
trade negotiations. During the Uruguay Round, business NGOs
and transnational corporations worked through governments to
influence the negotiations,' 89 but other NGOs did not have
189. Susan K. Sell, Multinational Corporations as Agents of Change: The Globalization of
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equivalent access. This author has not yet seen any good propos-
als for regularizing the infusion of NGO ideas into a future trade
round. Until a method is devised, governments could put some
individuals from NGOs on their delegations.
B. Executive
The executive activities of the WTO occur in the various
Councils (such as the Council for Trade in Services), Bodies
(such as the Textiles Monitoring Body), and Committees (such
as the Committee on Agriculture). 9 At present, none of these
organs have organized consultations with NGOs. Yet all of them
should.
Article V(2) of the WTO Agreement provides authority for
holding such consultations. Until the WTO General Council
reaches a consensus to do so, the chairs of the various WTO sub-
sidiary organs should meet with interested NGOs on a regular
basis pursuant to the authority in the current NGO Guide-
lines.19 ' For instance, the chair of the Committee on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures could meet with NGOs interested in
promoting food safety.
Ideally, NGO interventions would spring from experience
rather than merely ideology. Some NGOs in Geneva will be part
of networks that include local grassroots groups, and often this
local-level experience can provide valuable insights to policy-
makers at the center.' 9 2 If well-structured, the competition
among NGOs will help distinguish good ideas from bad.
In preparing for NGO input, the WTO can draw lessons
from the way that other international organizations involve
NGOs. Two useful examples are the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD") and UNCTAD. The
OECD Trade Committee holds consultations with a broad range
of NGOs. 193 So does UNCTAD, and these efforts demonstrate
Intellectual Property Rights, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL A.FFAIRs 169-98 (A.
Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
190. Most of the WTO organs might be characterized as "legislative" rather than
"executive" because they are composed of governmental representatives. The Textiles
Monitoring Body ("TMB") is an exception because it is composed of persons who are
appointed by ten governments selected by the WTO Membership. Agreement on Tex-
tiles and Clothing art. 8. This Agreement delegates specified authorities to the TMB.
191. See NGO Guidelines, supra note 28, para. 5.
192. EDWARDS, supra note 177, at 23-25.
193. Lawrence Speer,, OECD Discusses Trade Liberalization with NGOs, But Wide Differ-
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that developing country NGOs can participate effectively. 194
The WTO needs to hear more from Southern NGOs in order to
counteract the domination of WTO politics by Northern govern-
ments.
195
The WTO can also take advantage of its proximity to the
International Labor Organization ("ILO") in Geneva and the
World Conservation Union ("IUCN") in Gland to secure conve-
nient NGO input through those organizations.' 96 If the ITO
agrees to provide observer status for the ILO, as it has with seven
other international organizations, then the ILO attendance will
be tripartite with governments, employer NGOs, and worker
NGOs. The IUCN is a hybrid organization whose membership
comprises seventy-eight States, 112 government agencies, and
735 NGOs. 1 97 By giving the IUCN observer status on appropri-
ate WTO committees, the WTO could secure advice from envi-
ronment ministries and NGOs.
The approach of mainstreaming NGOs into the WTO's
work is better than setting up an overall NGO advisory commit-
tee. Recently, Supachai Panitchpakdi, who will be the next WTO
Director-General, gave new support to the idea of an NGO advi-
sory committee.' 98 But as the WTO symposia showed, bringing a
rainbow of NGOs togetherin one room frustrates any in-depth
discussions on particular issues.
C. Judicial
The WTO should establish procedures to enable NGOs and
individuals to submit amicus curiae briefs to panels and to the
Appellate Body. The government delegates to the WTO appar-
ently believe this matter should be dealt with by them rather
ences Persist, BNA DAILY REP. 'FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 24, 2000, at A8; Aide-Memoire, Infor-
mal Consultation between the Trade Committee and Non-Governmental Organizations
(Oct. 23, 2000), at http://www.oecd.org/ech/NGO/summary.
194. UNCTAD began holding annual consultations with NGOs in 1988. See http:/
/www.unctad.org/en/subsites/ngo.
195. See Chee Yoke Ling, No Sleeping After Seattle, 11 OUR PLANET 23-24 (2000),
available at http://www.urplanet.com/imgversn/Ill/ling.html.
196. JeffreyJ. Schott, The WFO After Seattle, in THE WTO AFrER SEATTLE 3, 34-35
(Schott ed., 2000) (discussing ILO); William M. Reichert, Resolving the Trade and Envi-
ronment Conflict: The WFO and Consultative Relations, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 236
(1996) (discussing IUCN).
197. See http://www.iucn.org.
198. Future WTO Chief Sees Voting as Alternative to Consensus Decisions, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 29, 2000, at 9-10.
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than the Appellate Body, and so the governments should act
quickly to promulgate needed procedures. Many close observers
of WTO dispute settlement would favor such action. Thomas
Cottier, a frequent GATT/WTO panelist, has written that "pub-
licity of hearings of panels and amicus curiae briefs from non-
governmental organizations could further enhance the legiti-
macy, and acceptance, of the WTO dispute settlement pro-
cess." '199 In 2000, the International Law Association recom-
mended "[a]llowing individual parties, both natural and corpo-
rate, an advisory locus standi in those dispute settlement
procedures where their own rights and interests are affected. 20 0
Boosting the transparency of the WTO dispute process will
improve public confidence in the adjudications and also facili-
tate the submission of briefs by civil society groups.20 1 To that
end, the following steps should be taken. First, WTO rules
should be changed so that government briefs to the panels be-
come public documents.20 2 (Of course, governments should be
able to designate specific information as confidential.) Second,
the WTO Secretariat should release the names and brief biogra-
phies of panelists. Third, the Secretariat should prepare a tool-
kit for how to submit an amicus brief. Such a toolkit might also
be designed by an NGO such as the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development. A toolkit could include
contact information for law school clinics in the United States or
elsewhere that might be willing to prepare a brief for a develop-
ing country NGO.
CONCLUSION
The debate about the appropriate role of NGOs at the
WTO will continue in the years ahead. Before he joined the
WTO in 1999, Director-General Moore wrote about the "virtue"
of civil society in exposing "the corruption and inherent dishon-
199. Thomas Cottier, The WTO and Environmental Law: Three Points for Discussion,
in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 56, 59 (Agata Fijalkowski & James
Cameron eds., 1998).
200. Declaration on the Rule of Law in International Trade, Conf. Res. 2/2000 (July 25-
26, 2000).
201. See Chi Carmody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Eco-
nomic Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1321, 1345-1346 (2000).
202. See DSU app. 3, para. 3 (permitting government to release its brief but not
requiring it).
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esty of closed minds and closed systems. "203 Inside the WTO,
Moore has butted against some closed- minds. Certainly, NGOs
are not more virtuous than governments. Yet as voluntary
groups, NGOs consist of individuals who care enough about an
issue to work for or against it. The WTO will stand a better
chance of reaching enlightened decisions and implementing
them if governments welcome competing views and try to get
NGOs to work for a better trading system. Moreover, inviting
NGOs into the WTO will keep them off the streets.
203. MIKE MOORE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: CITIZENSHIP OF THE MILLEN-
NIUM 160 (1998).
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